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The Public Option: Government-Provided
Off-Street Parking in Downtown
Philadelphia
John P. Caskey*
As of late 2009, the Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) owned and
operated eight off-street parking facilities in downtown Philadelphia. At the
same time, there were 134 private-sector commercial parking facilities in
downtown. This paper argues that there is no economic rationale for PPA’s
presence in the market, because PPA ’s exit would lead to almost no
detectable effect on either the supply or pricing of off-street parking. Thus,
one can only understand the presence of the public option by taking an
historical and political perspective. The City entered the off-street parking
market in the 1950s because the automobile was undermining the
competitiveness of downtown businesses and these business interests
complained that the private sector was not meeting the need quickly or
cheaply enough. Their political clout and the desire by the City to halt the
relative decline of downtown property values led the City to enter this
market. The City used a public authority to carry out this policy because a
parking authority could be fiscally independent of the City and, it was
argued, would be apolitical. Shortly after its creation, however, local —and
later state—politicians recognized that the PPA could be used for
patronage employment, something that early advocates of parking
authorities apparently had not foreseen. Over time, this political
calculation became the rationale for the PPA to continue to operate offstreet parking facilities in competition with the private sector.
INTRODUCTION
As of late 2009, The Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) owned and
operated eight off-street parking facilities—garages and lots—in downtown
Philadelphia, an area known as Center City.1 At the same time, there were
134 commercial private-sector parking facilities in Center City.2 For
economists, this is puzzling.3 Why is the public sector competing with the
*
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private sector in this market? Does the presence of the PPA lots and
garages affect the market for off-street parking in Center City, or would the
market function more or less the same without them? If the presence of
publicly-owned parking facilities has little impact on the downtown
parking market, why then does the PPA remain in this business?
In this paper I seek to answer these questions. I ask initially whether the
presence of publicly-owned off-street parking facilities has a significant
effect on the supply or pricing of off-street parking. My conclusion is that it
does not. So why is the public sector competing with the private sector in
this business? I argue that one must take an historical and political
perspective to answer this question. In brief, Philadelphia’s government
entered the off-street parking market shortly after the end of World War II
as it became apparent that the widespread use of the automobile was
undermining the competitiveness of central city businesses, especially retail
firms. The City also worried that the deterioration of Center City property
values would reduce property tax revenues. Private entrepreneurs
recognized the demand for off-street central city parking and began to
retrofit or create structures to meet this need as early as the 1920s, but
downtown business interests thought that the private sector was not
meeting the need quickly or cheaply enough. Certainly, the Great
Depression and war-time supply restrictions during the 1940s and early
1950s hampered the ability of the private sector to build off-street parking
structures. Once these constraints were lifted, the private sector could
respond, but the political advocacy of downtown business interests and the
desire by the City of Philadelphia to halt or slow the relative decline of
Center City business activity and property values led the City to begin
building off-street public parking facilities in the early 1950s.
The City used a public authority to carry out this policy because a
parking authority could be fiscally independent of the City, and its
advocates argued that an authority would be apolitical and business-like.
Shortly after its creation, however, local—and later state—politicians
recognized that the PPA could be used for patronage employment and to
support economic development goals of local politicians, something that
early advocates of parking authorities either had either not foreseen or had
ignored. In any case, I argue that there is no economic rationale for the
contemporary PPA to operate off-street parking facilities, but there is a
historical explanation for how it got into the business and a political
rationale for it to continue.
I. WHAT ROLE DO THE PPA’S GARAGES AND LOTS PLAY IN THE
CENTER CITY PARKING MARKET?
In this section, I ask whether the PPA’s Center City parking facilities
have a detectable impact on the downtown parking market.4 Before doing
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so, however, I note that the PPA’s current rationale for being in the Center
City off-street parking market is unspoken and unclear. There are no
contemporary studies arguing that there is a shortage of off-street parking
in Center City, nor are there recent studies arguing that market failures
prevent the private sector from meeting the need for off-street parking. In
fact, the prevailing view seems to be just the opposite. Richard Voith, for
example, provides a careful economic analysis making the case that too
much off-street parking can damage the economic productivity of a central
business district (CBD), as well as its attractiveness to many workers and
residents, by destroying its unique feature—a dense collection of office
workers and residents who interact for business and leisure.5 These
interactions foment and disseminate new ideas, sometimes serendipitously,
which raise the productivity and excitement of the CBD. Abundant offstreet parking is antithetical to density and can diminish the productivity
and vibrancy of a CBD. Inga Saffron, the Philadel phia Inquirer’s
architecture and urban planning critic, wrote a strident article supporting
the view that Center City Philadelphia has more than enough off-street
parking.6 In any case, my review (in August 2009) of PPA’s website did
not find any explanation of why it operates downtown parking facilities.7
To keep this section reasonably brief, I do not delve further into the
question of whether Center City has too little or too much parking, nor do I
discuss whether the pricing of Center City off-street parking is optimal for
the development of the downtown.8 Rather, I simply ask whether the
supply or pricing of Center City off-street parking is detectably different
because the PPA operates eight facilities there.
As of late 2009, PPA’s facilities accounted for about 13 percent of the
off-street parking slots in Center City (see Table 1). It is of course,
impossible to answer the counterfactual: If PPA had never existed, how
many fewer slots might exist in the City? As I discuss in the section on the
history of the PPA, there were no obvious market failures that prevented
the private sector from supplying off-street parking, so it is reasonable to
think that the private sector would have supplied a roughly equivalent
number of aggregate Center City parking spots with or without the PPA. In
any case, it is clear that if the PPA were to exit the business, it could
presumably sell its eight facilities to private operators who would almost
certainly continue to use them for parking in the foreseeable future since it
would be very costly to convert them for another use. Alternatively, the
PPA could retain ownership of the facilities and lease them to privatesector operators, ensuring that they remain parking facilities for the term of
the leases. Under either approach, the supply of Center City parking would
be unaffected or barely affected for many years to come.
It is not clear what effects PPA’s parking facilities might have on prices
in Center City. It depends on what the PPA is trying to accomplish with its
off-street parking facilities (which it does not explain) and, in some cases,
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how private-sector parking facilities react to its policies. The PPA might,
for example, set its prices below the prices prevailing at private facilities. If
the private facilities do not match the PPA prices, then the PPA’s facilities
would offer a lower-cost alternative for off-street parkers. If the operators
of private-sector parking facilities match, or nearly match the PPA’s
parking rates, then the PPA might reduce general parking prices in Center
City, or at least in the facilities near those of the PPA.
Alternatively, the PPA could set its prices to maximize profits. If so, its
prices should be similar to those of nearby private facilities, which are
presumably doing the same thing. Since the PPA transfers its revenues,
beyond those it judges necessary to support its long-term operations, to the
City of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia School District, it might
maximize profits in an effort to maximize this fiscal transfer.9
Finally, if the PPA is seen primarily as a source of patronage
employment (something I discuss later in the paper), it might seek to
maximize its employment positions. In this case it would operate its own
parking facilities rather than lease them to private-sector firms and would
operate them with unnecessarily high levels of staffing or supervision.
Under this scenario, it would set market-level prices but have below-market
rates of return due to the featherbedding.
In order to compare prices at PPA facilities to those at private facilities,
between July 22 and August 5 of 2009, I collected parking prices at all offstreet parking facilities in Center City Philadelphia, which I defined as
reaching from the north side of South Street to south side of Vine Street
and between Front Street and the Schuylkill River. During this time, I also
collected data from the PPA’s website and from the websites of privatesector operators on the number of parking slots in each parking facility. In
the relatively few cases in which data on the number of parking slots were
not available for private-sector facilities, I made my own estimate while
visiting the facility. Table 1 presents data on the market share of the PPA
and the largest private-sector operators.10 Table 2 presents the average
prices for three types of parking situations for the PPA facilities and for the
private-sector parking facilities.11
As indicated in Table 1, the Center City off-street parking market is
moderately concentrated. The three largest operators (one of which is the
PPA) control slightly over half of the Center City parking slots.12 As shown
in Table 2, the average price for parking at a PPA facility is below the
average for parking at a private facility in all three pricing categories. This
could mean that the PPA sets its prices below its competitors or that PPA
facilities have less desirable locations or amenities. Certainly, prices for
off-street parking vary by the location of the facilities.
As shown in Table 3, average prices vary across Center City
geographical quadrants, but there is no consistent pattern. The quadrants
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that are the most expensive for commuters can be the least expensive for
evening parkers. As indicated in the bottom of the table, facilities that are
located farther away from City Hall (the geographical central point of
Center City) are on average less expensive than those that are close to City
Hall. While this pattern is consistent across all three parking price
categories, it does not hold for individual facilities. A facility that is far
from City Hall but close to popular theaters, for example, might have a
higher evening parking rate than one that is close to City Hall.
Table 1: Parking Market Share in Center City
Parking Firm
Number of Center City
Parking Slots
Central Parking
Parkway
Phil. Parking Authority
Interpark
Park America
FiveStar Parking
Patriot Parking
Expert Parking
EZ Park
Other parking firms

7,331
6,809
4,626
3,289
2,872
2,750
2,234
1,921
1,551
2,965

Total

20.2%
18.7%
12.7%
9.0%
7.9%
7.6%
6.1%
5.3%
4.3%
8.2%

36,348

Table 2: Average Parking Prices in Center City
All‐day rate
One‐hour mid‐day
rate
PPA Average
$12.97
$8.06
Average for Private
Facilities

Market Share

$13.44

$10.77

Table 3: Parking Prices by Location Within Center City
Average for:
All‐day rate for
One‐hour rate
typical commuter
mid‐day
NE quadrant
$11.93
$10.98
NW quadrant
$15.24
$10.13
SE quadrant
$12.07
$10.03
SW quadrant
$14.72
$11.18
≤ 4 blocks
$15.55
$11.99
from City Hall
≥ 6 blocks
$12.59
$9.98
from City Hall

Peak evening rate
(6–10 pm)
$9.11
$13.81

Peak evening rate
(6–10 pm)
$14.39
$10.22
$13.66
$14.47
$14.87
$12.96
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Given such variation in the pricing of parking by location, I examined
the locations of the eight Center City PPA facilities and contrasted the
prices for parking at these facilities to those at private facilities located
within three blocks of the PPA locations. My analysis of these data leads
me to the following conclusions.
In all eight cases, the commuter rates charged at the PPA facilities are
similar to those charged in nearby private garages. In seven out of eight
cases, the one-hour mid-day rates at the PPA facilities are similar to those
found in nearby private facilities. In one case, the PPA garage next to a
Center City shopping mall (“The Gallery Mall”), PPA’s rate is markedly
lower than those at nearby private facilities. Finally, in half of the eight
cases, the PPA’s evening parking rates are similar to those prevailing in
nearby private facilities. The four exceptions are the PPA rate at the
Gallery Mall, the PPA rates at its two facilities at 15th and Arch, and the
PPA evening rate at this garage at 1540 Spring Street. In these cases, PPA
rates are modestly lower than those in nearby private facilities.
What do these pricing patterns suggest that the PPA is trying to
accomplish with its parking facilities? The answer is unclear. Certainly the
pricing for day-long commuters’ parking and the pricing (with one
exception) for mid-day short term parking suggest that the prices for
parking at PPA facilities are similar to those at nearby private facilities. It is
theoretically possible that the PPA is setting its prices below those that
would prevail near its facilities were the PPA’s facilities not present, and
that the private-sector facilities are lowering their prices to match
approximately the PPA’s prices. But a comparison of the prices at private
facilities near PPA facilities with the prices at private facilities at a
significant distance from the PPA facilities does not support this
hypothesis. Rather, it appears that the PPA sets its parking prices similarly
to the way the private-sector facilities set theirs. This is consistent with the
notion that the PPA is trying to maximize its earnings in order to maximize
its fiscal transfers to the City and School District. It is also consistent with
the notion that the PPA is maximizing earnings in order to create revenue
to support the greatest number of patronage employment opportunities at
the PPA. It could also be some combination of these two objectives.
In the case of peak evening parking rates, about half of the time the
PPA rates are generally modestly below those prevailing in the surrounding
private lots. This could suggest that the PPA is consciously setting
somewhat lower rates in order to promote evening economic activity in
Center City. It could also suggest that its facilities have a disadvantage in
terms of location, perceived security, or amenities compared to the nearby
lots, and that the lower prices are intended to offset such disadvantage. This
latter view strikes me as likely to be correct, given that the PPA facilities
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with the lower evening prices tend to be very large garages, underground
garages, and/or old unadorned concrete garages.
There is a second striking pattern in the data: the wide variation in the
prices for parking at nearby parking facilities. To some extent, this may
reflect differences in the visibility, convenience, amenities, or perceived
security of the facilities, but I strongly suspect that it also reflects
information problems in the market. In the case of PPA’s facility at the
Gallery, at the time of my survey it charged $3 per hour for mid-day shortterm parking, which is less than a third of what most of the surrounding
parking facilities were charging. Moreover, at the time of my survey this
PPA garage (with 850 parking slots) appeared to have substantial numbers
of open parking spaces. It is difficult to believe that the small differences in
location or nature of the facilities justify such a large price differential.
Rather, I speculate that most of the people paying $10 per hour or more
were unaware that a nearby facility was charging $3 per hour.
In an ideal market, consumers have full information about the quality
and prices of the goods or services that they are comparing. In choosing
off-street parking, however, drivers have traditionally obtained pricing
information, especially for short-term parking or infrequent parking, by
driving from facility to facility and reading the posted pricing information,
which is sometimes inconveniently posted. Given the associated search
costs, owners of parking facilities have some pricing power. For instance,
an owner of a facility that is nearly identical to another will still get some
customers when he or she charges a somewhat higher price than its
competitor.13
In any case, the data strongly suggest that PPA’s parking facilities have
no significant impact on either the general price level or supply of parking
in Center City parking market. If the PPA were to sell the facilities and exit
the parking business, taking care to select buyers that would not create
much more concentrated ownership in the market, most people parking in
Center City would certainly not notice any difference. It is therefore
puzzling why the PPA continues to own and operate Center City parking
facilities.14 In what follows, I argue that one needs an historical and
political perspective to provide the answer to this puzzle. Only an
interdisciplinary perspective can lead to an understanding of contemporary
public policy toward Philadelphia's downtown off-street parking market.
II. WHEN AND WHY DID CITIES START TO PROVIDE
OFF-STREET PARKING?
The very first automobiles were built at the turn of the 20th century, but
by 1910 there were only about 468,000 automobiles and trucks registered
across the nation.15 By 1913, however, Henry Ford had largely perfected
the mass production of the Model T and other manufacturers were building
far more reliable cars than they had just a few years earlier. As indicated in
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Figure 1 below, the number of registered automobiles and trucks grew
explosively between the early 1910s and 1929.16 In 1929, there were 26.5
million registered cars and trucks in the country.
Figure 1: Number of Registered Motor Vehicles
in the United States
Number in T housands
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Although motor vehicle registrations declined somewhat in the face of
the Great Depression, it resumed its growth after 1933. By the 1930s, it was
common for many office workers and downtown shoppers—who a few
years earlier would have taken a streetcar—to drive their cars to downtown
locations. As Richard Seltzer noted in his 1942 study of trends in
Philadelphia, “While the number of people entering and leaving the central
district in the year 1938 is 11% less than in 1928, the total number of
vehicles transporting these passengers has increased 30%.”17
The explosive growth in car ownership created tremendous congestion
in the dense urban centers of large American cities. Certainly, these cities
had struggled with congestion before, especially as streetcars and delivery
wagons competed for use of city streets in the late 1800s. But the arrival of
the automobile introduced a new problem that cities had not faced with
streetcars: where to park them when people drove into dense urban centers.
When cars were rare in the 1910s, they could generally be easily
accommodated parked alongside city streets. By the mid-1920s, this was
increasingly problematic.
From the beginning of the development of the automobile, car owners
had to store them. In their book, Lots of Parking: Land Use in a Car
Culture, John Jakle and Keith Sculle explain that the automobiles of the
early 1910s were ill-equipped to function in winter and their owners often
sought to store them in a building during inclement weather.18
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Entrepreneurs responded by leasing space in livery stables or other such
structures and by constructing parking garages in urban areas:
By 1915, most cities contained at least a few garages purposely
built for car parking. Early storage garages, irrespective of their
origin, were used primarily for long-term parking, especially
winter storage in cities where open or unenclosed cars precluded
year-round use.19

In the late 1910s and early 1920s, the streets in large cities were
becoming crowded with parked cars and, since the cars were winterized by
that time, this was a year-round phenomenon. In many cases, downtown
parking was haphazard, with some cars parallel parking, some parked at
angles, some on sidewalks, some in medians, etc. This greatly impeded the
flow of traffic and led to two reactions. First, municipal governments began
to regulate curbside parking.20 Second, entrepreneurs began to build
facilities for off-street parking:
By 1920, every large city had dozens of small business
entrepreneurs variously experimenting with parking as a profit
making enterprise. …In Philadelphia, W.W. Smith started with a
single lot in 1921, rapidly expanding in 5 years to 20 lots and 8
garages. … Philadelphia’s downtown parking operations occupied
lots cleared of buildings, with corner lots being preferred.21

The destruction of old buildings and the conversion of the cleared land
into parking lots accelerated in the 1930s. With the onset of the Great
Depression, many landlords found that they could not rent their office
space or residential properties, or that they had to rent the space at much
reduced rates. Municipal governments, however, did not reduce property
taxes commensurately. Landlords responded by demolishing their buildings
and replacing them with parking lots. Property taxes on land without
structures were much lower and the cleared lots could earn revenue
meeting the demand for off-street parking.22
This situation certainly applied to Philadelphia. The Philadelphia
Evening Bulletin reported the results from a City of Philadelphia study that
found 178 parking lots in Center City covering 38 acres.23 Most were
created through the destruction of old buildings, including some historical
landmarks. The study estimated that the City lost at least $400,000 a year in
tax revenue from such land use conversions.
Beginning in the 1930s, cities began to permit some municipally-owned
land to be used for parking. In all cases that I have found, the cities
provided parking lots—not garages—and the cities apparently either rented
the land to a private-sector operator who charged customers to park their
cars or simply permitted free parking on the land. As Orin Nolting and Paul
Opperman noted in 1938:
Off-street parking lots are a new municipal activity. Thirty-three
cities in at least 17 states, or about one-fourth of the cities covered
in this study, have established such facilities, while several
additional cities are considering plans for developing municipal
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parking areas….In most instances the land was already owned by
the city and was not acquired specifically for parking purposes….
Only two of the 33 cities charge a fee for parking. The charge at
the Grant Park area near Michigan Boulevard in Chicago is 25
cents for 24 hours.24

In the case of Philadelphia, it is unclear when the city first began to use
city-owned land for parking. In a Philadelphia Evening Bulletin article of
1935, however, it is evident that the city was already leasing some of its
land to private-sector operators of parking lots at that time.25
There is no careful economic analysis that I could find, from the 1930s
through the 1950s, to explain why municipal governments had to provide a
service that the private sector was also providing. The common explanation
of the era was that downtown businesses were suffering relative to those in
the newly developing suburbs because of an absence of low-cost parking in
central business districts. In addition, tax revenues from the central
business districts were declining relative to revenues from outlying areas
due to falling relative property values. But no analyst provided a theoretical
rationale for why the private sector would not provide sufficient downtown
parking.26 Typically, analysts of the era would write that downtown land
was too expensive to justify use as parking facilities. In other words,
advocates for downtown municipal parking facilities wanted governmentsubsidized parking, though they rarely stated this explicitly.
Nolting and Opperman, for example, argued in 1938 that the lack
of downtown parking was a major factor behind the decentralization of
cities:
It is easier in these days of excessive traffic to get to where you
are going than to dispose of your automobile at its destination—if
the terminal point is in the central business district. Universal
ownership of automobiles has created a demand for terminal
facilities in central business districts that is of great concern not
only to municipal officials but to business interests and above all
to the drivers of motor vehicles. Not many years ago these
parking requirements were met without great difficulty….Unless
improvements are forthcoming shoppers who arrive in autos will
tend to seek sections possessing greater convenience, and the
trend toward decentralization will be still further augmented.27

Based on this analysis, the authors concluded:
Many traffic authorities argue that the provision of adequate
parking space in or near business districts is a public
responsibility and that only through municipal ownership can
adequate provision be made for permanent terminal parking
facilities. Merchants realize that parking facilities are essential to
business and that if the problem is not solved a costly
decentralization of business will result.28
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In a 1942 study planning for the post-World War II redevelopment of
Philadelphia, Richard Seltzer made the same point.29 He argued that
parking difficulties in Center City encouraged businesses to locate outside
of the central business district,
The difficulties encountered in parking leads many prospective
purchasers to buy in outlying districts and, due to the limited time
permitted on the streets for parking, the number of purchases
made by many others is curtailed.30

Anne Alpern reached a similar conclusion in her analysis of the issue
in Pittsburgh, stating that the movement of business toward the suburbs
had made downtown business interests acutely aware of the “close
relationship between adequate parking and economic survival of the
central business districts.”31
Another, related rationale that advocates for municipal parking facilities
provided was the decline in downtown tax revenues. Alpern, for example,
in her law review article advocating municipal off-street parking facilities,
wrote of the “tremendous tax losses” due to “the exodus from the city to
suburban areas because of traffic congestion and the unavailability of
parking space”.32 Similarly, Edward Mogren, writing in 1953 for the
automobile-industry-funded Eno Foundation, stated:
Municipalities, large and small throughout the country, are
experiencing the same deterioration in downtown area tax paying
potentiality….There are other contributing causes, but parking
deficiencies are one of the most important reasons for the
substantial declines of these various city district tax revenues.33

In addition, while Mogren did not claim that the private sector could not
provide the proper amount of off-street parking, he argued that for
unexplained reasons the private sector was responding too slowly:34
Many municipalities have taken action to ease their parking
problems. Leadership has been assumed by municipal
administrators who believe implicitly in private enterprise but feel
that their city cannot and should not go without this service
because private interest has lagged in providing it.35

Beyond the arguments that municipal governments had to enter the offstreet parking business either to save downtown business districts or to
prevent the decline in tax revenues, there were other rationales advanced
for why municipal governments were especially suitable for this purpose.
Mogren, for example, argued that there could be coordination and planning
problems if the provision of off-street parking were left to the private
sector:
Curb parking regulations are administered by the municipality.
Most effective regulation of curb parking cannot be obtained
unless a coordinated agency controls off-street parking as well....
Reasonably complete parking relief cannot be realized
through the undirected and sporadic efforts of private initiative
alone. Long-range solutions must contemplate both short-time
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(shopper) and long-time (worker) parking needs and follow
comprehensive plans for facility development and location.36

The problem with Mogren’s rationale is that he does not explain why
there would be such coordination problems if off-street parking were left to
the private sector, especially given that local governments have zoning
powers. It is not sufficient, to cite a hypothetical example, to argue that the
local government must construct downtown office buildings because it
already has the responsibility for the adjacent public streets. One must
explain why the private sector and the government cannot divide these
responsibilities without significant coordination problems.
These authors of the 1930s through 1950s did not openly call for
subsidized off-street parking in central business districts. Jakle and Sculle,
however, recognized that this was the implication if the public sector was
to build off-street parking that would be low-cost for the customers:
Private interests might finance peripheral lots, but government
subsidy was necessary for truly close-in parking, given that land
costs remained high in downtown cores. Center-core parking, and
certainly free or even low-cost parking located there, absolutely
required municipal subsidy.37

To economists, these explanations for why municipal governments
should enter the downtown off-street parking market are puzzling.
Traditionally, economists argue for government intervention in a
market if there are natural monopolies, externalities, or public goods.
In the case of off-street parking, none of these classic market failures
seems to be present. None of the authors argued that private
monopolies controlled the market, and none argued that externalities
led to an undersupply of parking. Off-street parking is certainly not a
public good; it is easy to exclude those who do not pay for the
service.38
Not all analysts of downtown parking problems called for
municipalities to build and operate facilities. Writing in 1927 about the
growing need for downtown off-street parking, Hawley Simpson argued
that:
Private capital should be given every encouragement to establish
storage garages, and cities should refrain from entering a field in
which there appears no logical reasons for municipal operation.
Even operation of sub-surface garages under public property is
not necessarily a municipal function, and private operation with
its greater potential economics, will better serve the public good.39

Similarly, Richard Seltzer, writing in 1942, blamed inadequate parking
for the relative decline of Center City Philadelphia, but he did not call
for a public sector solution. Rather, Seltzer recommended that Center
City stores form cooperatives to operate parking lots and garages and
that they subsidize the parking for their customers.40
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It is…recommended that merchant groups lease or otherwise
obtain possession of vacant lots in proximity to their places of
business and operate them on a co-operative basis whereby a
person entering the store, or those making purchases, may park
free of charge, or at little expense, for a limited time.41

One can argue, of course, that the residents of outlying areas benefit if a
city’s CBD is healthy. Certainly, studies have found that the prosperity of
suburban communities is linked to the prosperity of the central cities they
surround.42 Thus, there could be externalities to any activity that benefits
the CBD. This could justify state- or metropolitan-level subsidies for
economic development initiatives in the CBD. It is far from clear, however,
that parking is the activity that is most deserving of subsidies. It could be,
for example, that reducing CBD property taxes or subsidizing the arts
would have a larger impact on CBD development than would building
municipally-operated parking facilities. Moreover, if the government
determines that it should subsidize parking, it could simply subsidize
parking in privately-owned facilities.
In summary, although not all public policy analysts who focused on
downtown parking issues prior to the 1950s called for the creation of
subsidized public parking facilities, the majority did. Their explicit or
implicit reasoning—and that reasoning’s consequences—was as follows.
By the 1920s, automobiles became a major means of transportation for the
middle class. Because storing automobiles takes enormous amounts of
space, dense CBDs were not compatible with cars. Many businesses that
traditionally located in CBDs, especially large retail stores, moved to
outlying locations that were built to accommodate the automobile. This led
to a decline in CBD property values and a general awareness that the CBD
was losing its regional preeminence. Given the demand for parking in
CBDs and the decline in property values, private-sector developers began
to build parking facilities in downtowns. But since many important
institutions and venues, such as government buildings, public transit hubs,
and cultural venues, were located in the CBD, downtown land remained
more expensive than outlying land. Thus, private-sector parking operators
had to charge more for parking downtown than their competitors in the
newly-developing outlying areas who, in fact, often offered abundant free
parking.43 This further encouraged decentralization and a slow relative
decline in property values in the CBD. Downtown property owners
resented this and argued for government-subsidized parking to reverse or
offset the trend. In other words, there was not a valid economic justification
for building government-subsidized off-street parking, but there was a
political rationale.
III. WHY A PARKING AUTHORITY?
Regardless of whether it was good policy for municipal governments to
begin to build and operate CBD off-street parking facilities, many were
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doing so by the late 1930s. This continued after World War II ended, but
with a twist. After the war, municipal governments began to ask their state
legislatures to allow them to create parking “authorities” to undertake the
work. In fact, Pennsylvania was the first state to enact legislation allowing
a municipal government to create an authority to build and operate offstreet parking facilities.44 The state passed the legislation in 1947, and
Pittsburgh immediately used this law to create its parking authority.
Numerous other states enacted similar legislation in the next few years.45
There were several rationales for creating authorities to build and
operate parking facilities. The authorities were empowered to acquire land
for parking and to issue their own bonds to raise money for the land
acquisition and to build the facilities. They could pledge future parking fee
revenues to repay the bonds. As Alpern explained in 1950, this was a key
motivation for the creation of the authorities:
Decreased assessed valuations and limitations on borrowing
power have placed most cities in a financial strait jacket from
which they have been able to extricate themselves by means of
the “authority” device. Parking authorities are able to defray the
cost of construction by the issuance of bonds payable out of
revenues. Authorities provide a speedy method for the solution of
the traffic problem without imposing an additional burden upon
the taxpayers.46

The authorities could function similarly to private businesses because their
actions did not need the approval of a city council or a state legislature.
They were governed by a board of directors whose members were
generally appointed by state or municipal politicians, but the board could
function in a very business-like fashion and was expected to be somewhat
isolated from political pressures since the members did not stand for direct
election. Thus, the authorities were expected to be relatively more efficient
and apolitical than a city department charged with building and operating
parking facilities. As Mogren explained in his 1953 book on parking
authorities, “Because of their autonomous nature, parking authorities are
free of political pressures often found in municipal government …. Being
dependent on their own earnings for continuation, there is an incentive to
develop high management and personnel efficiency.”47 The state legislation
creating the parking authorities generally gave them the power of eminent
domain, so they could force the sale of privately-owned property in order to
assemble land for parking purposes. Alpern argued that this power was
critical to their effectiveness: “One of the most important powers given to
parking authorities by legislative enactment is the power to condemn
property for parking purposes.”48
In the case of Pennsylvania, however, this power was apparently rarely
used in the ten years that followed the 1947 legislation. In a 1957 study of
that state’s parking authorities, Nelson Guild reported,
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The power of eminent domain granted to parking authorities by
the enabling legislation, is generally used only as a last resort. Of
the 25 authorities reporting in this survey, only two exercised this
power in acquiring all properties. Five authorities condemned 10
per cent or less of their sites and 14 authorities did not resort to
condemnation proceedings at all.49

Not surprisingly, some private-sector interests—especially those that
owned off-street parking facilities—objected to the creation of government
authorities that could build and operate parking facilities that would
compete with private businesses. Advocates of parking authorities, such as
Mogren, argued that parking authorities would not threaten private-sector
interests since, according to him, their purpose was:
[N]ot to exclude private enterprise from the parking field. Rather,
where substantial services are rendered by privately developed
facilities, parking authority activity is aimed at supplementing
such operation and stimulating extension of private installations.
In areas where private initiative in parking is ineffective or nonexistent, authority activities are directed toward coordinating citysponsored facilities into a comprehensive system. Merchant and
businessmen cooperation in the development of attractive,
serviceable parking areas is possible under authority parking
management.50

Nevertheless, Pennsylvania’s 1947 law allowing parking authorities to use
the power of eminent domain was challenged in court. A Pittsburgh
resident sued that city’s parking authority, arguing that the purpose for
which the land was seized did not constitute a proper public use. The
plaintiff was joined in the proceedings by the “Downtown Parking
Association, a voluntary association of owners and operators of parking
facilities in the downtown area...” of Pittsburgh.51
The case went to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which ruled in
favor of the Parking Authority without offering an explanation for why the
private sector alone could not meet the need for off-street parking. In its
ruling, the court explained:
Those attacking the constitutionality of such a law…obviously
labor under the mistaken assumption that its purpose is merely to
cater to the convenience of the owners and operators of motor
vehicles…its real purpose is to promote larger and more general
good of the community by freeing the streets of the impediments
and perils arising from dangerous and often intolerable conditions
of traffic congestion….It is no constitutional objection to the
statute, nor does it derogate from the public character of its
objective, that the Authority will to some extent conduct what
may heretofore have been regarded as a private enterprise…52

As this section indicates, public parking authorities were created to
isolate from city budgets the fiscal impact of building parking
facilities. They were expected to be apolitical, business-like
organizations. They were given the power of eminent domain but, at
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least in Pennsylvania in the early years, this power was rarely used.
They competed with private-sector parking facilities, but generally did
so gingerly. In Pennsylvania, the courts supported this public/private
competition, but did not provide an economic rationale for why the
private sector alone could not meet the need for off-street downtown
parking.
IV. THE PPA AND OFF-STREET PARKING IN CENTER CITY
In Philadelphia’s case, the creation of the PPA generally follows the
factors outlined above, except for the PPA's growing role as a patronage
employer. In the early 1950s, there was a widespread perception that
Center City did not have enough off-street parking and that this was hurting
its regional competitiveness. The state believed that a public authority was
the best means for building off-street parking facilities, and the City used
this mechanism to respond to downtown business interests that worried that
insufficient, low-cost parking was hurting their sales. Very soon after the
creation of the PPA, however, local—and later state—politicians began to
view it as a source of patronage employment. Over time, this political role
clearly became the main rationale for the public sector to maintain
ownership and operation of off-street parking in competition with the
private sector.
In January of 1950, the Philadelphia City Council organized the PPA
under the state’s parking authority law. One would expect that downtown
property owners (other than owners of private parking facilities) and
commercial interests would see this as a step toward the construction of
favorable government-subsidized parking. One would also expect owners
of private parking facilities to oppose it. News accounts of the time suggest
that this was indeed the case.
Philadelphia’s City Council last Thursday passed the Philadelphia
Parking Authority Ordinance, a measure opposed by most of the
city’s parking lot and garage operators. What swayed the
councilmen were much more influential voices—those of
mercantile, industrial and financial organizations whose interests
are intertwined with the business health of the city. The Chamber
of Commerce, the Philadelphia Merchants Association, the City
Planning Commission, the Keystone Automobile Club and the
American Automobile Association, the Redevelopment Authority,
the Philadelphia Highway Traffic Board, and the City Traffic
Engineer all agreed with the need for action.53

Contemporary news accounts also suggested that a strong factor behind
the push to have a government-owned parking authority construct parking
facilities was the perception that the private sector had not met the need.
The Philadelphia Inquirer reported that, “[B]etween 28,000 and 30,000
[people driving cars] have business in the teeming, congested blocks that
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lay between Walnut and Arch Streets, stretching from 4th to 18th. And they
want to park their cars not too far away.”54 It went on to note that this area
had only 3,500 off-street parking places and that the Philadelphia Highway
Traffic Board estimated that this created a deficiency of 23,000 spaces.
Shortage of parking spaces in Center City in the early 1950s was not a
universal perception. Certainly, garage owners, who opposed the creation
of the PPA, argued that there was no shortage. But it is reasonable to think
that a lack of construction during the Great Depression, the rationing of
materials for civilian use during the 1940s and early 1950s, and increasing
rates of automobile usage would have created a shortage of downtown
parking. If so, one would expect the private sector to respond by building
more parking as soon as these constraints eased. In other words, the
problem would likely have been solved by a bit of patience since there
were no fundamental market failures that prevented the private sector from
responding. Indeed, news accounts indicate that the private sector was
anxious to build new facilities. In 1952, for example, promoters of a 500space private parking garage sued the PPA (unsuccessfully) to try to
prevent it from building a competing nearby public parking garage. The
backers of the private garage explained that they were delayed with their
project only because “[d]emolition of existing buildings has been
delayed...because of the national emergency and government restrictions on
critical materials.”55
In launching a parking authority whose mission was to build off-street
parking facilities, government officials were clearly sensitive to the charge
that the government was entering a market that was traditionally served by
the private sector. As the Philadelphia Inquirer reported within a few days
of the City Council’s approval of the agency:
Everyone connected with the decision to put the city into the
parking business, at least as a “silent partner” to private operators,
has expressed regret that it must be done, but private industry,
they declare, has failed to find an answer, and so it’s up to the
city.56

According to the New York Times the new chairman of the PPA announced
that “the authority had no intention of competing against the privately
operated garages.”57
Once the PPA was operational, it decided to focus on Center City
because this is where it believed there was the greatest need and because its
limited initial staffing and funding ($150,000 in loans from the City)
permitted it to undertake a very small number of projects.58 The PPA
settled on two initial projects: a parking garage facing one of the city’s
most elegant small parks, Rittenhouse Square, and a second garage several
blocks away on Chestnut Street between 10th and 11th. In neither case did
the PPA use its power of eminent domain to acquire land. Both garages
were designed to hold approximately 500 cars.59 Despite some delays due
to steel shortages during the Korean War, the Walnut Street garage opened
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at the end of 1953 and the Chestnut Street garage in 1954. In the ensuing
years, the PPA added eight other Center City parking facilities to its
original two and, in 1985, sold the one it built across from Rittenhouse
Square to an insurance company.60 As noted, the PPA leases one of its
facilities to a private sector firm, so the PPA currently operates eight
parking facilities in Center City.
Once war-time constraints eased, the private sector also began to
respond to the need for Center City parking. By 1957, one news account
noted that the PPA was losing money on its two original garages and cited
a survey that found a surplus of spaces around these facilities.61 It
explained that downtown retail interests wanted still more public parking
based on the theory that “where there is parking, there will be parkers—and
shoppers.” It noted, however, that private sector investors had a different
view: “[D]emand must be present and accounted for before a parking
facility—private or public—can be justified.”62
Once it was decided, rightly or wrongly, that the public sector should
build garages, one of the rationales for creating parking authorities was that
such agencies would be subject to far less political pressure than would a
department of city government. In the case of the PPA, however, astute
Philadelphia politicians, and later Pennsylvania state politicians, quickly
took advantage of their ability to appoint the PPA’s board members, PPA’s
exemption from civil service hiring requirements, and its ability to award
some no-bid contracts to favored businesses. In 1950, when the PPA was
created, a Republican political machine had long controlled Philadelphia’s
government. The Republican mayor appointed five men, with staggered
terms, to the PPA board. The chair, who had a five-year term, was Francis.
J. Chesterman, a retired president of the Bell Telephone Company of
Pennsylvania. The board hired a former Republican deputy city treasurer to
be the managing director.63 At the same time, a group of young Democrats
was laying the groundwork to gain control of city council and the mayor’s
office.64 In late 1951, the city elected a Democrat, Joseph S. Clark, as
mayor. Within two years of Clark’s assuming office, Chesterman resigned
as chair of the PPA, telling the mayor, “[Y]ou have decided to yield to long
term pressure by the Democratic city organization to treat the authority as a
political plum”.65 The mayor denied this, but he did acknowledge that, “I
had been urged to reconstitute the board of the Parking Authority with
individuals who were sympathetic to the aims of my administration and
who would retain as executives and counsel men who did not owe their
primary allegiance to the Republican city organization…”66
As the Democratic machine began to dominate Philadelphia politics
from the mid-1950s onward, the PPA became a part of that very machine,
providing employment positions to Democratic ward leaders, committee
members, and out-of-office politicians.67 In a gentlemen’s agreement with
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the Republican Party, the PPA also hired a smaller number of Republican
ward leaders and committee members.
This situation was relatively stable between the late 1950s and 2001,
but as the Parking Authority added new responsibilities—especially when
it took on the job of enforcing on-street parking regulations—employment
at the agency ballooned. In 1972, the PPA reportedly had just seven fulltime employees.68 By 1977, it had taken the responsibility of providing
security for the public parking facilities at the airport and had
approximately 77 full-time workers, 32 of whom were retired or disable
policemen hired under Mayor Rizzo’s administration. Mayor Rizzo was the
former Police Commissioner of Philadelphia. The most highly paid
employees tended to be politically active Democrats or relatives of such
people. But the same news article that reported these facts also noted that
“the authority has taken the position that it is only a quasipublic agency and
is independent of the city government. As a result, authority records often
are difficult to get.”69 Rizzo was not apologetic about using the PPA to
employ his supporters. As he explained, “There’s not much patronage
around anymore with everything civil service and (the authority) is the only
area where you can help people who help politically…Patronage always
has been a way of life in America….It’s even done in private industry.”70
By 1982, employment at the PPA had grown to 215.71 In the next year, it
was scheduled to double, as the PPA was given responsibility for enforcing
on-street parking regulations as well as managing its off-street parking
facilities. Over the next two decades, PPA employment and responsibilities
continued to grow.
In 2001, the Republicans shocked the Democrats and the City by using
their control of the state legislature and governor’s office to take control of
the PPA. The state legislature passed a law that gave the governor the right
to appoint the PPA’s board. The law also temporarily increased the number
of board members from five to eleven. The governor promptly appointed
six Republicans to the board, giving them a voting majority.72 The previous
five board members’ positions phased out as their six-year terms expired,
and the board continued with just the six new members, who were given
ten-year terms. Although this gave the Republicans firm control of the PPA
for a period of time, the Republicans continued to honor the gentlemen’s
agreement with the Democrats that the PPA would provide patronage
positions to both Democrats and Republicans. As the Philadelphia Inquirer
reported,
Six Philadelphia ward leaders—five Republican, one Democrat—
and at least 174 city Republican and Democratic committee
members were on the Authority’s payroll as of August
[2007]…"When the Republicans took over, they did a smart
thing: They sat down with the people in the leadership over there
and said, ‘We’re not going to commandeer this place,’” said City
Councilman Frank Rizzo, a Republican.73 Before the state
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takeover, the informal agreement between the city’s Democratic
and Republican bosses was that about one of every three
patronage jobs at the Parking Authority would go to Republicans.
That ratio has roughly reversed since the Republicans took
command.74

In 2004, the state legislature designated the PPA to enforce taxi cab
regulations in the City and gave it some other minor new responsibilities.
Employment at the agency continued to expand. According to an
independent report for the City of Philadelphia’s Office of the Controller
on the PPA, as of mid-2009 the PPA employed nearly 1,100 full- and parttime personnel.75 The off-street parking division employed 11, on-street
parking employed 639, and airport parking employed 187.76 70 people are
employed in administration and 19 in strategic planning.
In addition to its role as a patronage employment agency, the PPA has
been used by local politicians to subsidize business development initiatives
in the City and, in one case, to help recover from a failed private-sector
development initiative. In the 1970s, for example, the PPA built its garage
adjacent to a new Center City shopping mall (“The Gallery”) as part of an
agreement with the mall’s developer.77 In 2001, a failed private-sector
effort to develop a site at 8th and Market into an entertainment complex left
a huge hole in the ground along one of Center City’s main thoroughfares.
Since City politicians had been major advocates of this project and had
committed public subsidies for the project, the gaping hole was evidence of
a glaring failure. The PPA stepped in, bought the site for $12 million,
paved it over, and turned it into a parking lot.78
CONCLUSION
There appears to be no good economic rationale for the public off-street
parking option in Center City Philadelphia. The PPA could exit the
business and there would be almost no detectable effect on the price or
supply of downtown off-street parking. Answering the question, “If not,
why does it then exist?” requires an historical and political perspective.
In the early 1950s, it was widely perceived that there existed a shortage
of off-street parking in Center City and that this shortage hurt downtown
business interests, downtown growth, and property values. This perception
was probably justified given the increasing rates of automobile ownership
and limited private-sector construction of all types during the Great
Depression, World War II, and the Korean War. It was in this period that
the PPA was created and began to build public parking facilities in
response to political pressures from downtown retail business interests and
in an effort to halt or slow the relative decline in Center City property
values. At the same time, as the constraints eased for the private sector, it
also built new facilities since there were no fundamental market failures
that prevented it from doing so. Simply put, the PPA may have accelerated
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the supply response, but left to its own devices, there was no reason that the
private sector would not have met the need.
Shortly after the PPA was created local—and later state—politicians
realized that the parking authority could be used to provide patronage jobs
and support for favored regional development projects. That is, whatever
the historical merit for the public sector to enter the downtown off-street
parking market, once it did, the rationale for remaining in that market over
the decades became political rather than economic.
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